Here is a question for people who think Bayes' theorem holds answers for epistemology. Suppose we have a coin. We estimate the prior probabilities of heads and tails at 50% each. We flip the coin 5,000 times. They all come up tails. Now we want to update our estimates of the probabilities of heads and tails. If we flip it again, what should we estimate the chance of another tails is?

This is a very generous question. Choosing prior probabilities is itself a serious issue, but we grant that. 5,000 data points, all with precise, unambiguous results, is not common in daily life. Plus the data can be summed up nicely and has a strong, easy to analyze pattern. And coin flipping is especially suited to a Bayesian approach. It's just as generous as a problem about picking different colored marbles out of a bag. And I don't ask for an explanation, only for a new probability estimate, which is again what Bayes is all about.

But I don't think Bayesians can answer this (or any harder question). If one tries, here is what you say to them next: "Would you agree that some parts of what you just said are not implied by Bayes' theorem, but are extra things you've added?" When they agree they've stepped a little beyond the bounds of the formula itself, then you can ask them about how much of their procedure for answering the question is Bayes' formula. And ask about where this extra part is coming from, and where to find a rigorous statement of how it works, and so on.

Now, here is a scenario for inductivists. I have a Rails application with a memory leak. I want to find the leak and fix it. How do I do it? You have a theory of knowledge, which is supposed to (along with deduction) explain how knowledge is created, right? So tell me how to create knowledge of my memory leak. Tell me how to solve a real problem.

I can repeat the test code which causes the leak thousands of times if you want. And I can run code that doesn't cause the leak thousands of times. You can have all the repeated observations you want. But I don't see how that will help. Tell me, Mr. Inductivist, how will repeating these observations help anything? Should I get different Rails applications, perhaps thousands of them, and see if they leak memory? I can do that, but is it really going to figure out where the bug in my program is?

Here is how I actually find memory leaks. I make guesses about where the problem might be, and then I think of ways to test whether I'm right or wrong. For example I guess it's in a certain section of code, then I delete that section and run the application and see if the leak goes away or not. Just like Popper said: guesses and criticism, trial and error.

I also run some programs to get statistics. What statistics? The ones I guess might be useful, such as a list of the most numerous objects in memory. How do I get from this list to figuring out which code is to blame? Sometimes I don't. Other times I think "Oh, lots of widgets, well I think I know where we create a lot of widgets" and I come up with a guess about which code is probably making them. None of this follows the inductivist model where you make repeated observations (of what? Just run the same exact thing over and over? If not, then how do you decide what to observe?) and then infer the answer from the observations (so i observe the leak every day for 3 years, and write down what happened each time, and then somehow I infer from this what the problem is? That "somehow" is very vague. That's where induction falls flat.)

One of the general patterns this post illustrates is that bad philosophy can be dealt with by asking it to be effective. Asking to see it in action. Even just in simple, realistic examples.

See also: Popper on Bayesians

Richard Feynman scored only 125 on an IQ test in high school.

People disagree. All the time. Consequently, people setting the policy for security forces will have disagreements.

It will be in their interest not to fight each other. They'll try to agree. But agreeing can be hard. People try to talk things out and come to an agreement a lot, and sometimes it works, but sometimes it doesn't. So, some disagreements will be resolved without a big hassle. But there will be some others that won't get resolved so easily. The security forces will either need to peacefully co-exist, side by side, *while they disagree about some things*, or there will be violence.

One way to try to solve this problem is not to have multiple security forces. If there's only one game in town, then there can't be any disagreements! Problem avoided. Right?

No. People will still disagree. The difference is that people who disagree with the only game in town have no good options. They'll be forced to monetarily fund a security force that is operating in a way they disagree with, rather than one they approve of more. That's bad! It's not nearly as bad as frequent gun fights in the streets would be, but it is quite bad.

Anarcho-capitalism wants to get rid of that badness. It wants disagreements not to be suppressed. Not expressed violently either. We need something else: a system that is responsive to people's opinions, and non-violent. Allowing multiple security forces, and having people choose which to subscribe to, has the "responsive to people's opinions" part covered much better than having only one security force that everyone subscribes to whatever they think of it. It harnesses the power of the market, so that security forces that please customers prosper, and ones that are not responsive to customers fail. Of course the market doesn't do that perfectly, but it does it better than anything else.

That leaves the violence issue. How will violence be averted?

Let's think about how violence is averted today. Here is one story of how it works: People do disagree with the Government about all sorts of things, like whether marijuana should be treated as similar to cocaine, or not. But they aren't going to take out a gun and do something violent about it. They would be up against overwhelming force. There are disagreements within the Government too. But for any given thing, when it comes down to it, there is always *one law* about who gets their way, and overwhelming force backing up that law. Sometimes the answer is complex, and involves multiple people and even voting, but there is always one unambiguous outcome backed by overwhelming force.

So the general idea is: for any given issue, there is some ultimate authority, backed by overwhelming force. That is how we avert violence. No one who disagrees wants to fight over it when they'll just lose really badly.

If there were a dozen security forces, and none had overwhelming force, there would sometimes be situations where two forces disagree, and taking into account their allies, they are roughly evenly matched. Close enough the outcome is in doubt. So will they fight it out? How do we make damn sure they don't?

First of all, pretend for a moment *you* are in charge of a security force. Would you want to fight it out? Would that be a temptation? Or would you bend over backwards to avoid it? I know I would want to avoid it.

Now let's consider again the story of how we avert violence today. Is it really because there is one clear law everyone follows? No, it can't be, because sometimes the law is ambiguous. Sometimes we have situations the law makers didn't foresee. Our real system involves people making judgment calls, and it's pretty adaptable. Now, those people making judgment calls sometimes disagree. Think of the 2000 election where people disagreed about counting votes. That could have been a serious problem! It could have turned violent! The country was split fairly evenly about which President they wanted. But it did not turn violent. Why? I think the most important factor, the thing that reliably averts violence, is that just like you and me, the people making those decisions did not want violence. It was more important to them to avoid violence than to become President, or get their way. They were willing to bend over backwards to avoid violence. Everyone involved on both sides was so averse to violence that it never came close to violence. I think the fact that people hate violence is a much larger factor than the threat that if they fought they would lose badly. Americans care more about what is right than which side is more powerful.

Why will security forces by run by people who are any less averse to violence than average American is today? In fact they will be run by people who are even more averse to violence, and better at avoiding it, than the average American today. If I have the choice between subscribing to a security force that has that kind of leader, and one that doesn't, it's obvious to me which to choose. And it would be obvious to most people.

Alright, now let's suppose the security forces are run by decent people who are eager to avoid violence. Not just because it'll save them money, but also because of morality. But still they don't agree. What will they do?

I'm sure there are multiple possible good solutions to this problem. Here is one: They will bid money.

The most common human flaw is underestimating the difficulty of figuring out the truth.

_William Godwin: A Biographical Study_ by George Woodcock, p 178, quoting Godwin writing self-analysis, not for publication:

I can scarcely ever begin a conversation where I have no preconceived subject to talk of; in these cases I have recourse to topics the most trite and barren, and my memory often refuses to furnish even these.

I consider smalltalk a way for people to get along pleasantly whether they are compatible or not. It's a way for people to talk without putting their own values and ideas into the conversation and thus risking disagreement. It's a waste of time; if you disagree, then learn from each other, and if you can't do that, then this is the wrong person for you to be talking with.

I agree with Feynman that figuring things out is hard. Godwin writes (The Enquirer, part 2, essay 8, page 292)

No one man ever completely understood the character of any other man.

Or the way I say it, "People are complex." Godwin elaborates on this well; read the essay if interested.

A few sentences later Godwin writes:

Let every thing be examined, as far as circumstances will possibly admit, before it as assumed for true.

Or in other words, figuring things out is hard.

I would go even a bit further than Godwin: if circumstances won't admit sufficiet investigation, then you don't know the truth. No excuse about unfortunate circumstances is good enough; the truth isn't easier to come by just because you have only limited ways of trying to find it.

The Enquirer, part 2, essay 8, page 285

The poets and fine writers of antiquity still appear to us excellent; while the visions of Plato, and the arrangements of Aristotle, have no longer a place but in the brains of a few dreaming and obscure pedants.

Most people today think highly of Plato and Aristotle. A notable exception is Karl Popper.

Interested in Popper?

Rafe Champion has a lot of information on his website The Rathouse. And he's added a new sitemap so it's easier to find.

http://www.the-rathouse.com/fullindex.html